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AbstrAct Refugee response planners no longer frame Syrian refugees merely as objects of humanitarian 
care. Increasingly they are portrayed as enterprising subjects, whose formal integration into labor 
markets simultaneously can create self-sufficient actors and cure the economic woes of host countries. 
However, bringing together humanitarian and economic agendas is not an easy task. This article 
analyzes the contradictions and frictions that have emerged in the process of implementing the Jordan 
Compact, a political commitment to integrate Syrian refugees into the formal Jordanian labor market, 
and which is supposed to showcase such win-win strategies. It argues that the Jordan Compact should 
be seen as a policy model that has achieved enough consensus and incorporated enough disparate 
objectives to be labelled a ‘policy success.’ Yet, central actors have neglected core features of Jordan’s 
political economy and labor market, and/or the lives and survival strategies of refugees, such that 
their radical blueprints of transformation have been disrupted. Despite the widespread commitment to 
the scheme, it is thus unlikely that the Jordan Compact will both reinvigorate the Jordanian economy 
and offer Syrians the prospect of a dignified, self-sufficient life, an important lesson for comparable 
schemes being rolled out across the globe.
Key Words: Forced migration; Governance; Informality; Labor markets; Jordan; Middle East 
studies; Neoliberalism; Policy mobilities; Special economic zones; Syrian refugees
More than five years have passed since Syrians began to escape en masse to neighboring 
countries to seek refuge from violent conflict. While their presence primarily was dealt with 
in the first years through ‘classic’ international interventions that viewed Syrian refugees as 
objects of humanitarian care and assistance, there has been a notable change in tack since 
2014. Western donors as well as international organizations have started pushing for the 
crisis response to be more development-oriented, aiming to make Syrian refugees more 
‘self-reliant’ or ‘resilient,’ and thus less dependent on international assistance.
The Jordan Compact represents a milestone in this process. In the Jordan Compact, issued 
at the conclusion of the London donors conference for Syria and the region in February 2016, 
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the Government of Jordan (GoJ) declared that in the coming years it would allow poten-
tially as many as 200,000 Syrians to obtain work permits in Jordan. Syrians’ formal labor 
market participation rapidly transformed from being a taboo topic into the new benchmark 
by which the government now would be held accountable by the international community 
and their donors. Not only that, but government representatives, donors, and humanitarian 
actors have presented these changes as a ‘paradigm shift’ in terms of how host states across 
the world could cope with large and protracted refugee situations.
‘Turning the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity’ has become the new 
collective mantra, and Jordan has become the showcase of this projected ‘win-win’ solution. 
The possibility of socioeconomic integration for Syrians in Jordan regularly is presented, 
especially by international advisers, as the means simultaneously to alleviate Syrians’ eco-
nomic woes and to reinvigorate (but also reduce) international support for Jordan by boosting 
its economy overall, and to reduce the numbers of Syrians opting to make the journey to 
Europe. Yet as this article shows, this policy model not only is problematic as such but also 
proven to be much more complicated than its designers’ depictions.
In order to demonstrate the significance and pitfalls of these supposedly fundamental 
policy changes in how refugees are governed, the article draws on academic discussions 
on humanitarian, refugee and development policies, as well as those on neoliberal reforms 
in Jordan and their effects on its labor market. In analyzing the main strategies pursued to 
implement this blueprint, the article teases out the political dynamics that have become 
apparent in the Jordan Compact’s realization, and the main points of friction that have 
emerged. We argue that in an attempt to build a policy model that elicits enough consensus 
to be ‘implementable,’ and to achieve a variety of disparate objectives, long-standing features 
of political economy in Jordan have been under-appreciated by most of the actors involved 
in designing the scheme, many of whom lack experience with (Jordanian) labor market 
issues, and/or with the lives and survival strategies of (Syrian) refugees. Specifically, in its 
unfolding, the Jordan Compact has run up against three main underlying dynamics that have 
shaped Jordan’s political economy for decades: (a) zonal development strategies, which 
have been a central but highly problematic feature of growth strategies in the country, (b) a 
nationally-segmented labor market that builds on specialized, precarious migrant labor, and 
(c) the relevance of informal labor and the political creation of informality. We argue that 
these three dynamics disrupt radical blueprints of transformation in ways largely unforeseen 
by their proponents, and already are starting to highlight the fundamental shortcomings of 
the initial compromise. Taken together, they will make it extremely difficult to square the 
circle of giving Syrians in the country the prospect of a dignified, self-sufficient life, while 
simultaneously making the Jordanian economic desert bloom.
To unfold this argument, this article begins by drawing on ethnographic literatures from 
the fields of development and humanitarianism to offer an analysis of policy models such as 
the Jordan Compact as compromises with inbuilt limitations and outlines the main features 
of the Compact and the Syrian refugee population in Jordan from this perspective. It then 
gives an overview of the Jordanian labor market, which provides an essential background to 
understanding how the attempts to implement the Compact have evolved. Subsequently, it 
examines the different strategies that are being pursued formally to integrate Syrian refugees 
into the labor market. Firstly, it analyzes attempts to expand investments, and thereby jobs 
for both Syrians and Jordanians, mainly in export-intensive industries in a number of Special 
Economic Zones. Secondly, it explores the difficulties experienced with efforts to substitute 
Syrian refugees for other migrant workers, with a specific focus on a high-profile garment 
industry pilot. Thirdly, the article turns to the informal labor market, where policy-makers 
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hope for the formalization of existing Syrian labor in sectors such as construction and agricul-
ture.1 In all three instances, we argue that, despite the high-profile alliances that have pushed 
to turn policy blueprints into reality, the defining features of the Jordanian labor market and 
political economy, which have developed over decades, have substantially complicated their 
realization. Our argument is based on 60 semi-structured interviews and numerous infor-
mal conversations conducted jointly or individually with staff of key agencies involved in 
these attempted policy shifts, as well as with Syrian refugees in Jordan, between June and 
November 2015, April and August 2016, and April and May 2017, and on an analysis of 
relevant policy documents and media reporting over the course of 2016/17.
The Jordan Compact: Making of a Global Policy Model and its (Syrian Refugee) 
Target Group
The Jordan Compact marks not only a shift in globalized thinking about solutions for pro-
tracted refugee situations but also a remarkable compromise. It has mobilized a range of 
actors, agencies, and agendas, and tied them together in a joint project. Such convergences 
can be created, as authors like David Mosse have argued, by a shared desire to create 
development policy successes and generalizable, global policy models. Yet these policy 
models tend to be reliant on their relative detachment from the complex realities upon which 
they are supposed to act. Different agencies enter into such policies or projects if they can 
(re)interpret them to fit their specific agenda, yet the different, and often conflicting, interpre-
tations that circulate are either the source of, or point to, unresolved conflicts and frictions.2
This disjuncture between plans and realities on the ground is an established subject of 
critical writing in analyses of development policies and projects. Scholars have analyzed the 
many ways in which communities of experts, (self-)mandated as trustees, misunderstand, 
explain away or simply ignore the complex realities of the populations and territories they 
are supposed to ‘improve’, and the effects these complexities have on the trajectories of 
such interventions and their target groups.3 This is also the case for humanitarian work-
ers and humanitarian interventions, which often are characterized by a particularly strong 
detachment from the displaced populations that are nominally the object of their care.4 The 
dynamics that create and maintain the networks of actors and agencies required for such 
projects of improvement are somewhat less commonly in focus within this literature, but 
1
 For reasons of space, this article does not discuss Cash for Work (CfW) initiatives, which have constituted an 
important activity for those actors, particularly many international NGOs, seeking to work on refugee liveli-
hoods. CfW schemes have been operating in many of Jordan’s Syrian refugee camps since their establishment, 
but more recently these activities have been rolled out to non-camp spaces as well. Due to their relatively 
short-term scope, they were initially not relevant to discussions on work permits. However, since the spring 
of 2017, increasing attempts have been made to translate CfW-based forms of employment into work permits.
2
 David Mosse (2004) Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and 
Practice, Development and Change, 35(4), pp. 639–671; see also David Lewis & D. Mosse (eds) (2006) 
Development Brokers and Translators. The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press).
3
 See i.e., James Ferguson (1994) The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic 
Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press); Mark Hobart (ed) (1993) An Anthropological 
Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance (London: Routledge); and Tania M. Li (2007) The Will to 
Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
4
 Michel Agier (2010) Humanity as an Identity and its Political Effects (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian 
Government), Humanity, 1(1), pp. 29–45; Barbara Harrell-Bond (2002) Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees 
Be Humane? Human Rights Quarterly, 24(1), pp. 51–85; Jennifer Hyndman (2000) Managing Displacement: 
Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
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have been highlighted by various authors who ethnographically analyze processes of making 
and implementing policy in different fields.5
The Jordan Compact illustrates these very dynamics—both the coming together of diver-
gent actors to form an ostensibly shared set of goals, and the remoteness of their compromise 
from the realities on the ground. Marking this particular context has been the coming together 
of two fields of expertise that were not so strongly integrated in the recent past.6 The search 
for solutions for protracted refugee populations in countries of first asylum has prompted 
forced migration experts, humanitarian organizations, NGOs and governmental actors to 
move their focus (once more) from ‘traditional’ humanitarian work toward labor market 
interventions. Simultaneously, economic planners, labor market experts, and businesses have 
had to integrate refugees into their conceptual and practical horizons. As we explore below, 
this, on the one hand, has created new relationships and alliances. On the other hand, this 
coming together of agendas and actors has revealed a number of unresolved inconsistencies, 
frictions and exclusions that have haunted the project since its inception. These have resulted 
from the structuring dynamics of the Jordanian labor market and the strategies and priorities 
of Syrian refugees, as well as their neglect by many of the actors involved.
At first glance the key stakeholders—including the GoJ, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners, and international donors—have 
made notable strides in terms of implementing the Compact. There are about 320,000 reg-
istered adult Syrian refugees in Jordan, and between the start of 2016 and early May 2017, 
almost 51,000 annual work permits had been issued to them,7 although slightly fewer than 
40,000 of those permits were valid in May 2017.8 In part, this progress was due to the GoJ 
providing a grace period for formalizing the status of Syrian workers, in which there were 
no work permit fees for employers, no fines for not having previously applied for work 
permits, and during which Syrians found working informally would not be sent to camps. 
International donors matched Jordan’s commitment; most notably, the World Bank endorsed 
a plan to facilitate access to up to $1.4 billion of credit at rates typically only available to 
lower-income countries and signed a $300 million, 35-year loan in the months following 
the Jordan Compact.9 Numerous other donors are supporting different schemes intended to 
increase Syrians’ labor market participation and the numbers of work permits issued. Funding 
5
 See i.e., John Clarke, Dave Bainton, Noémi Lendvai & Paul Stubbs (2015) Making Policy Move: Towards a 
Politics of Translation and Assemblage (Bristol: Policy Press); Frank Fischer (2003) Reframing Public Policy: 
Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices (Oxford: OUP).
6
 It should be noted that the focus on refugee livelihoods is, in and of itself, far from new. Both in Jordan and other 
contexts this has, at various times, been a focus of humanitarian agencies. See Jeff Crisp (2003) United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Refugee Livelihoods and Self-Reliance: A Brief History. Available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/, accessed July 11, 2017; Sari Hanafi, Leila Hilal & Lex Takkenberg (eds) (2014) UNRWA 
and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief and Works to Human Development (Abingdon: Routledge).
7
 Maha Kattaa (2017) ILO’s Support to the Formalization of Syrian Refugees in the Labour Market in Jordan, 
May (Amman: International Labor Organization [ILO]).
8
 See LWG (2017) Livelihood Working Group, Amman, Jordan. Minutes of Meeting, 09.05.2017. Available at: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107, accessed July 11, 2017. While it had been widely 
assumed among humanitarian actors that the work permit target would mean how many Syrians are working 
simultaneously, the GoJ was arguing in spring 2017 that each annual work permit given since the beginning 
of 2016 should cumulatively count, even if more than one permit had been issued to the same individual. 
Author Interview with Project Management Unit (PMU) Representatives, Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation (MoPIC), Amman, May 2017.
9
 Jordan Times (2016a) World Bank approves $300 million loan to Jordan, Sept 28. Available at: 
http://www.jordantimes.com, accessed January 3, 2017.
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levels increased significantly after the Jordan Compact, even though there has been a slump 
in the funding of the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) in 2017.10
This progress might not have been expected. As one of the most important Western allies 
in the region, it often has been sufficient for Jordanian governmental actors to declare their 
commitment to a variety of donor-sponsored ‘development opportunities’ in order to get 
much-needed funding, without necessarily following through with plans that donors envis-
aged.11 This is even more noteworthy given the sensitivity of the subject: until the negotiations 
that culminated in the Jordan Compact, GoJ authorities were loath to imply publicly, through 
words or actions, that Syrians may be another (semi-)permanent refugee population, in a 
country in which the divisions between populations of Palestinian and ‘East Bank’ ances-
try are an important political fault line.12 This included restricting Syrians’ access to the 
formal labor market, attempting to keep camp spaces appearing temporary, and restricting 
non-governmental organization (NGO) programming on work and livelihoods, such that 
even ‘vocational training’ was deemed too politically sensitive a phrase to use.13 Following 
through with the Compact’s main stipulation to provide Syrians with work permits is thus 
a notable change. At the same time, a number of inconsistencies become visible as soon as 
one takes a closer look at the Compact’s aims and its practical limitations.
Cracks begin to show when asking even very basic questions, such as who does the target 
group actually comprise. Of particular note is the vexing question of how many working 
age Syrians reside in Jordan, and thus how many work permits might plausibly be given or 
wanted. As of the summer of 2017, according to UNHCR, there are approximately 660,000 
registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, a number that has increased only very slightly since 
the Compact was issued. Of these 660,000, approximately 150,000 are registered camp res-
idents, while the rest are registered as living in Jordan’s cities, towns, villages and farmland. 
In contrast, the Jordanian census of December 2015 reported that there were just over 1.25 
million Syrians (refugees and non-refugees) residing in the country. This census number 
has been treated with strong skepticism in the humanitarian sector, in particular considering 
the controversy that surrounded the allegedly inflated numbers of Iraqis in Jordan in 2007.14
10
 The Jordan Response Plan (JRP) was established in 2014 as a government-led response plan to the Syrian 
refugee presence, and as part of the GoJ’s ongoing efforts to refocus the response to target Jordanian host 
communities more strongly. It was 62 percent funded in 2016, compared to only 33 percent in 2015. At the 
end of May 2017, the JRP was less than 8 percent funded. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)’s Inter-Agency Financial Tracking Service, which only includes the refugee 
component, reported that in 2016, 94 percent of the total requested funds were received, which is an exception-
ally high number. In the first quarter of 2017, 29 percent of the total requested funds were received: see MoPIC 
(n.d.) Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis. Available at: http://www.jrpsc.org, accessed August 6, 
2017; UNOCHA (2017) Inter-Agency Financial Tracking-Jordan Jan-Dec 2016. Available at: http://data.unhcr.
org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107, accessed August 6, 2017.
11
 See i.e., Jane Harrigan, Hamed El-Said & Chengang Wang (2006) The IMF and the World Bank in Jordan: 
A Case of Over Optimism and Elusive Growth, Review of International Organizations, 1(3), pp. 263–292.
12
 Oroub El-Abed (2014) The Discourse of Guesthood: Forced Migrants in Jordan, in Anita Fábos and Riina 
Isotalo (eds) Managing Muslim Mobilities (London: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 81–100.
 
13
 Author Interviews with ILO livelihoods specialist, Amman, November 2015; Andrew Harper, UNHCR Jordan 
Country Representative, Amman, August 2015; see also Lewis Turner (2015) Explaining the (Non-)Encampment 
of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan, Mediterranean Politics, 
20(3), pp. 386–404.
14
 See Katharina Lenner (2016) Blasts From the Past: Policy Legacies and Policy Memories in the Making of 
the Jordanian Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, EUI Working Papers, MWP Red Number Series, 32 
(Florence: EUI), pp. 10–15.
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The question of how many Syrian refugees live in Jordan has an obvious bearing on the 
viability of the 200,000 target. Slightly over half of registered Syrians in Jordan are under 
18, and therefore ineligible for work permits; further, in the occupational data that UNHCR 
holds on approximately 290,000 camp and non-camp Syrians aged between 18 and 65, 
over 100,000 are housewives, and many thousands may be physically or mentally unable 
to work. Camp residents, who are more than 20 percent of registered Syrian refugees in 
the country, also have experienced difficulties in accessing work permits. This is despite 
initially being, at least implicitly, one of the main targets for the work permits scheme. 
Different actors involved in governing Syrian refugees, including the Ministries of Interior, 
Labor, and Planning, have to some extent contrasting agendas, which variously emphasize 
control over the entry and exit of people and goods into and out of camps, or the economic 
integration of Syrian refugees. These divergent agendas have led some officials to attempt 
to disrupt the process of granting camp residents work permits.
Even for those Syrians in Jordan who are willing and able to work,15 obtaining a work 
permit is far from straightforward. Characterized as ‘the work permit maze,’16 the process 
of obtaining a work permit can include reclaiming confiscated documents, applying for a 
Ministry of Interior (MoI) service card (which in late April 2017 only just over 200,000 
non-camp Syrian adults held),17 a security check, obtaining a rental contract or an address 
statement from UNHCR, and paying fees for administration and for health certificates, 
fees that are applied inconsistently across labor directorates.18 Some Syrians living in urban 
areas are unable to obtain an MoI card because they left the Za’tari refugee camp after a 
particular date without the requisite paperwork, making them ineligible for an MoI card, 
and thus also for a work permit.19
Another consequence of who was brought to the table and the compromise they made has 
been the exclusion of non-Syrian refugee populations from the Compact. These include the 
approximately 63,000 registered Iraqi, 8,000 Yemeni, and 3,500 Sudanese refugees.20 Given 
their relatively small numbers in relation to Syrians, it should be relatively easy to facilitate 
access to the labor market for other registered refugee populations as well.21 However, the 
strong prioritization of Syrian refugees in recent donor-Jordan relations, the lack of advocacy 
15
 An ILO report estimates that in the spring of 2017, around 85,000 Syrian refugees were working formally or 
informally. ILO (2017) Work Permits and Employment of Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Towards Formalising the 
Work of Syrian Refugees (Amman: ILO), p. 30.
 
16
 Jordan INGO Forum (JIF) (2016) The Work Permit Maze. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/, 
accessed July 11, 2017.
17
 Urban Verification Updates as of April 30, 2017, personal communication through UNHCR, May 2017. The 
GoJ does not provide figures of the number of MoI cards disaggregated by age but provided a total figure of 
418,063. The estimate above is based on the assumption that the distribution of MoI cards would, in terms of 
age, reflect the overall demographics of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan.
18
 Livelihood Working Group (LWG) (2016) Livelihood Working Group, Amman, Jordan. Minutes of Meeting, 
16.6.2016. Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107, accessed July 31, 2016. The 
requirement for an additional health certificate, which came with additional fees, was finally waived in September 
2016, but that does not prevent new hidden fees from being charged in the future, perhaps especially when less 
donor and agency attention is focused on work permit questions.
19
 See Luigi Achilli (2015) Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Reality Check, MPC Policy Brief, 2015/2 (Florence: 
EUI/MPC). There are no official figures for this group. Informal estimates from humanitarian agency workers 
range between a few thousand and tens of thousands.
20
 UNHCR (2017) Jordan – UNHCR Jordan Overview, May 2017. Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianref-
ugees/country.php?id=107, accessed July 9, 2017.
21
 Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development (ARDD) (2016) Accessing the Labor Market for Syrian 
Refugees: Lessons Learnt From the Iraqi Refugee Crisis (Amman: ARDD), p. 9.
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on behalf of non-Syrian refugees in Jordan, and humanitarian agencies’ focus on problems 
that are deemed both pressing and solvable, at the expense of thornier and/or seemingly 
unimportant questions, prevented the inclusion of non-Syrian refugees.22 While these factors 
limit the number of refugees who plausibly could access work permits, this is far from an 
exhaustive explanation for why attempts to implement the Jordan Compact have faltered. In 
these attempts, the stakeholders of the Compact have confronted a reality more complex than 
the one sketched out in their blueprint for transformation, particularly in terms of Jordan’s 
labor market. This process has revealed the divergent interests and agendas that underlay 
ostensibly shared objectives.
Jordan’s Labor Market after 20 Years of Neoliberal Transformation
The inconsistencies, frictions and exclusions that have complicated the implementation of the 
Jordan Compact must be understood in the context of the broader dynamics that characterize 
Jordan’s political economy and labor market after more than 20 years of neoliberalizations. 
The Compact resembles these broader strategies of transformation. At the same time, it can-
not overcome the contradictions and structuring dynamics of the labor market, which in part 
are caused by, but also have disrupted, different neoliberalizations. Like the Jordan Compact, 
many of the (attempted) transformations of Jordan’s political economy have relied on pol-
icies and rationalities that purport to solve countries’ socioeconomic challenges through 
globally-circulating neoliberal solutions, which seek to increase the ‘market orientation’ 
of economies and societies, reinforce free trade and minimize government intervention, 
while curbing public spending, especially on social issues. Long evident in the country’s 
relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its repeated implementation of 
structural adjustment policies,23 this approach has been embraced and spurred on by a new 
generation of technocrats who became increasingly powerful upon Abdullah II’s coronation 
as King of Jordan in 1999, and other major international donors have supported it.
These rationalities have fueled the reorganization of space to suit the interests of capital 
through the creation of development corridors, special economic zones, and other spaces of 
exception.24 Zonal development technically has been pursued since the 1970s, when a number 
of Free Trade Zones were created, although it only really took off with the establishment 
of Qualifying Industrial Zones in the mid-1990s, followed by the Aqaba Special Economic 
Zone Authority (ASEZA) in 2000, and a number of Special Economic Zones since 2008. 
To its promoters, zonal development is a vital element of the vision to turn the country into 
a regional investment hub, elevate the role of the private sector, and integrate Jordan more 
firmly into a truly globalized economy.25 Accompanying such macroeconomic strategies have 
been various attempts to foster entrepreneurialism and self-reliance, e.g., through microcre-
dit programs targeting different social groups as well as various (community) development 
22
 Author Interview with European donor agency official, Amman, April 2016.
23
 Lamis Andoni and Jillian Schwedler (1996) Bread Riots in Jordan, Middle East Report, 201, pp. 40–42; Anne 
M. Baylouny (2008) Militarizing Welfare: Neo-Liberalism and Jordanian Policy, Middle East Journal, 62(2),
pp. 277–303; J. Harrigan et al., The IMF; Karen Pfeifer (1999) How Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and even Egypt 
became IMF ‘Success Stories’ in the 1990s, Middle East Report, 210, pp. 23–27.
24
 See i.e., Shamel Azmeh (2014) Labor in Global Production Networks: Workers in the Qualifying Industrial
Zones (QIZs) of Egypt and Jordan, Global Networks, 14(4), pp. 495–513; Pascal Debruyne (2013) Spatial
Rearticulations of Statehood: Jordan’s Geographies of Power under Globalization, PhD thesis, Ghent University; 
Christopher Parker (2009) Tunnel Bypasses and Minarets of Capitalism: Amman as Neoliberal Assemblage,
Political Geography, 28(2), pp. 110–120.
25
 See P. Debruyne, Spatial Rearticulations, pp. 118–162.
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projects in urban and rural spaces,26 the ostensible aim of which has been to get Jordanians 
out of a supposedly outdated orientation toward public sector employment, enhance ‘human 
capital development,’ and create better ‘fits’ with the labor market. While such initiatives 
have transformed conceptions and spaces of the political,27 their successes—as defined by 
their own goals—have been questionable. Public sector employment remains crucial and 
desirable to many Jordanians, and microenterprise projects remain fraught with contradic-
tions that are relatively apparent to their participants.28 Most of the special economic zones 
not only have been relatively unsuccessful in attracting investment but also they have failed 
to create positive spillover effects on local economies and labor markets. This is not least 
due to an over-reliance on migrant labor.29
While large-scale labor migration, both to and from Jordan, preceded the rise of these 
projects to neoliberalize Jordan’s political economy, it has since become embedded in these 
attempted transformations. In the context of the oil boom in the 1970s, many Jordanian 
citizens sought opportunities in the oil-producing states of the Gulf. The remittances from 
this employment fueled a demand for services and investments in infrastructure, which in 
turn dramatically increased the number of migrant workers in Jordan, particularly from 
Egypt and South East Asia.30 These trends, which continue to this day, reinforced the need 
for migrant labor to do many of the low-skilled jobs that the Jordanian labor market in fact 
offers—for example in sectors such as agriculture, construction, the service sector, and 
domestic labor. More recently, labor market reforms have focused on reducing the cost of 
labor and increasing labor market ‘flexibility.’31 This has been achieved both through the use 
of migrant labor, and its spatial segregation into economic zones. The garment sector, one 
of the areas discussed in this article, provides a particularly striking example of this trend. 
The sector has a quota that allows up to 75 percent of its workforce to be non-Jordanian. 
This extensive use of migrant labor, and the specific labor regime to which workers are 
subjected, is a key factor in the success of the garment industry, which is one of Jordan’s 
most significant export sectors. This labor regime, helped by various exceptions from the 
labor law, exploits the isolation of migrant workers from their surroundings, increases their 
availability to work longer and harder, and thereby enables factories to respond to the 
ever-increasing pressure on suppliers for on-time delivery and shorter production times in 
26
 See i.e., Myriam Ababsa & Rami F. Daher (eds) (2011) Villes, pratiques urbaines et construction nationale 
en Jordanie (Beirut: Presses de l’Ifpo); K. Lenner (2015) Projects of Improvement, Continuities of Neglect: 
Re-Fragmenting the Periphery in Southern Rural Jordan, Middle East – Topics & Arguments, 5, pp. 77–88; 
Mayssoun Sukarieh (2016) On Class, Culture, and the Creation of the Neoliberal Subject: The Case of Jordan, 
Anthropological Quarterly, 89(4), pp. 1201–1225.
 
27
 See i.e., Sami Zemni & Koenraad Bogaert (2009) Trade, Security and Neoliberal Politics: Whither Arab Reform? 
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the global garment industry. With its reliance on the free availability of such dis-embedded 
workers, this regime has become the cornerstone of garment production in Jordan’s Industrial 
Estates, formerly designated as QIZs.32
Another way in which labor market ‘flexibility’ in Jordan has been produced and rein-
forced is informality and the non-enforcement of regulations. Although structural adjustment 
policies in Jordan did not lead to the same degree of informalization of labor as elsewhere 
in the Global South,33 a 2013 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) study reported 
that informal employment accounts for 44 percent of all private sector employment in 
Jordan.34 Its scope presumably further has increased since that time, in part due to Syrian (and 
other) refugees entering the labor market. Many migrant laborers working in the informal 
economy either do not have work permits or are working outside the sector for which they 
originally were granted a permit.35 This form of (non-)regulation of migrant labor, which 
allows migrants into the country but only partly formalizes their status, constitutes a vital 
part of neoliberal forms of governance, in that it allows for further deregulation of labor 
markets, and creates downward pressure on wages. While not necessarily an intentional, 
top-down strategy controlled by political decision-makers, it becomes effective though a 
myriad of individual actors pursuing strategies (on a local level) that are politically tolerated 
or facilitated.36 In Jordan as elsewhere, illegalization and the non-enforcement of labor market 
regulations have benefitted employers, who profit from a labor force that is made vulnera-
ble to exploitation and that tends not to claim its labor rights.37 As a result of these broader 
developments, the Jordanian labor market is characterized by a high degree of segmentation 
between the public and private sectors, formal and informal economies, genders, Jordanian 
nationals and migrant workers,38 and also between different nationalities of migrant labor. 
Different nationalities are (formally or informally) recruited in accordance with particular 
skills ascribed to them, which supposedly qualify them for work in specific sectors.
32
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Yet these neoliberalizations should not be conceived of as proceeding in smooth and 
homogenous ways. As a new generation of literature has demonstrated, such forms of gov-
ernance are uneven and variegated.39 In Aihwa Ong’s terms, neoliberal reforms bring mar-
ket-driven calculations ‘in the management of populations and the administration of special 
spaces,’40 but ‘exceptions to neoliberalism are also invoked, in political decision, to exclude 
populations and places from neoliberal calculations and choices.’41 Such exceptions can be 
understood as a way to appease important constituencies or, more abstractly, as articulations 
with alternative, residual or currently marginalized projects, which inscribe themselves into 
dominant political economic strategies.42 One way in which such exceptions are evident in 
the Jordanian labor market is through the existence of ‘closed sectors.’ There are at least 
17 job types or sectors, including engineering, teaching, medicine and many service sector 
jobs, that are formally closed to non-Jordanians, even though many non-Jordanians work 
in these sectors informally, and there is even some unclarity about exactly which sectors 
are ‘closed.’43 This exception to the neoliberal logics that drive the use of migrant labor in 
Jordan protects the interests of a domestic constituency, whose protestations about reduced 
public sector employment opportunities and high unemployment dovetail with a narrative 
that there are ‘too many’ labor migrants in the country, and that these migrants are competing 
with Jordanians for jobs.44
The current attempt to integrate refugees into the labor market should be read as another 
rendering of these attempted transformations. Jordan is once again a laboratory for sweeping 
changes, but this time Syrian refugees have been singled out as the population that can rein-
vigorate Jordan’s economy. Rather than being objects of humanitarian care and maintenance, 
Syrian refugees are framed as unused human capital, which can be made productive as a new 
category of migrant workers and help Jordan to overcome the long-standing deficiencies of 
its production regime. At the same time, attempts to preserve the aforementioned exceptions 
to neoliberalism remain apparent, particularly in the GoJ’s staunch refusal to contemplate 
opening up the closed sectors—even though such a move could substantially increase the 
numbers of work permits issued to Syrians.45
Given the Compact’s articulation with these previous strategies of transformation, it is 
unsurprising that, in its implementation, it has encountered many of the same stubborn and 
persistent challenges facing previous attempts to restructure Jordan’s political economy and 
labor market. The Compact particularly has run up against the problems inherent to attempts 
to create an export-driven economy through zonal development, the consequences of a 
nationally-segmented labor market and the regimes of control it relies on, and the country’s 
informalized economy. This becomes apparent when analyzing the key strategies pursued 
to formally integrate Syrian refugees into the labor market.
39
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Changing the Rules of Origin, or Special Economic Zones revisited
At the center of the policy instruments sketched out in the Jordan Compact was a renewed 
focus on Jordan’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs)46 as drivers of increased manufacturing 
production, combined with the renegotiation of EU-Jordan trade relations. Much like the 
Compact overall, this component signals the successful integration of the agendas of a 
wide range of actors and institutions. Yet, it has not been able to produce the promised 
rewards, or to overcome the underlying problems that belie the zonal development model. 
The expected reinvigoration of manufacturing through the Compact was based centrally on 
the EU’s commitment to changing the rules of origin (RoO) that govern the Jordan—EU 
Association Agreement. Much like elsewhere in the Global South, these RoO largely have 
prevented significant (Jordanian) exports to the EU by setting a high threshold for the 
percentage of any exported good that needs to originate in the country in order to qualify 
for tariff benefits, and by defining ‘origin’ in a narrow sense.47 Given the low percentage of 
local raw material input in most goods exported from Jordan, these rules have acted more 
like a trade barrier than a means to facilitate Jordanian exports to the EU.48 Renegotiating 
them was thus high on the list of Jordanian priorities for the London donors conference. 
The subsequent agreement, concluded in July 2016, eased these regulations for a number 
of designated SEZs, and Jordanian officials celebrated it as a major breakthrough. They 
declared that it not only would make manufacturing more profitable, facilitating investment 
and expanded production levels, but also create tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of jobs 
for Syrians and Jordanians.49
The agreement stipulates that for a period of 10 years, effective immediately, Jordan and 
the EU temporarily relax the applicable RoO for individual factories located in 18 industrial 
and development zones across the country, and that employ no less than 15 percent of Syrian 
labor. From the beginning of the third year, factories will be required to employ a minimum 
of 25 percent Syrian refugees to qualify for the new rules. These relaxations adopt a wider 
definition of the types of processing required for non-origin products to obtain originating 
status, thereby making it easier to export products to the EU for fewer or no duties.50 The 
46
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scheme is supported by a substantial concessionary World Bank loan and a 5-year tailored 
World Bank project, which particularly focuses on attracting investment, changing labor 
regulations, and improving Jordan’s investment climate.51
This striking deal marks a convergence of different logics and agendas and has created 
new alliances between hitherto unconnected actors. It uses Jordan as a laboratory and a 
showcase for a new global blueprint for economic development in refugee hosting states, 
thereby attempting to marshal the unused ‘human capital’ of refugees. Driven by donor 
pressure to bring down aid levels (as well as the desire to find solutions for refugees in their 
countries of first destination), humanitarian and development actors, for some time, have 
been thinking about ways to accomplish a shift in this direction.52 Recently, this process 
has been connected with the idea of employing refugees in spatially contained zones. In an 
influential proposal, Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, two Oxford University professors 
who undertook a study tour of Jordan in conjunction with UNHCR, advocate such a fresh 
approach to refugee ‘integration’ in countries of first reception. The idea is to reconcile 
refugees’ needs and wishes for self-sustainability with the security concerns of host states 
and their aversion to long-term integration, by fostering a refugee-driven economy that is 
removed from the broader labor market, thereby taking pressure off it. Rather than refugees 
being an economic burden, this zonal economy—a second-tier and temporary form of soci-
oeconomic integration—would boost the overall local economy, particularly in export-ori-
ented manufacturing. At the same time, formal employment possibilities in neighboring 
states would provide the incentive for Syrians to stay where they are, rather than attempt 
the journey to Europe.53
Mediated through the global networks of expertise in which the promoters of this new 
scheme are embedded,54 the model already has gone global. It has been taken up as a 
blueprint by the UK government, which recently announced that the scheme, originally 
developed for Jordan, also will be applied to Ethiopia, where the creation of industrial parks 
is supposed to create jobs for Eritrean refugees, and in effect stop them from coming to 
Europe.55 The idea has engaged the imagination of a variety of players who currently are 
seeking to redefine responses to refugee crises,56 and turned it into a governmental project 
that claims global validity.
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Yet these supposedly global schemes always need to mobilize adherents in specific set-
tings in order to become meaningful and effective there.57 In Jordan, the WANA Institute, 
a socioeconomic think-tank, played a decisive role in fleshing out the idea.58 Sponsored 
by King Abdullah II’s uncle, Prince Hassan bin Talal, and headed by Dr Erica Harper, the 
wife of the (then) UNHCR country representative for Jordan, the institute’s participation 
secured crucial royal buy-in, and created a close link with UNHCR, as well as the Oxford 
professors.59 The scheme also was shaped by the agenda of the proponents of zonal devel-
opment, for whom it has provided an occasion to re-create the raison d’etre of economic 
zones.60
The reinvigoration of zonal development strategies is taking place despite their ques-
tionable record worldwide,61 and despite a dispute about their overall benefits to Jordan’s 
economy and labor market.62 While the Industrial Estates/QIZs and ASEZA have managed 
to attract substantial investments, this is less the case for the Development Zones, some of 
which only exist on paper, whereas others have a mixed record at best.63 Yet, with such an 
array of prominent agencies and individuals as driving forces, ostensibly united around a 
common set of aims, the idea gained considerable traction. At the same time, the heteroge-
neity of their agendas, as well as the detachment of many stakeholders from, and limited 
understanding of, the actual functioning of the manufacturing industry, Jordan’s trade regime 
and/or the SEZs in Jordan, also has caused considerable friction.
In the lead-up to the EU deal, some conflicts of interest became visible, for example in 
discussions about whether the new regulations should apply by factory, by zone, or across 
sectors and spaces. The GoJ and Jordanian business associations pushed for a deal that was 
as open as possible, creating access to the EU market in return for a certain percentage 
of Syrians being employed in a sector, zone, or in the country as a whole.64 Yet, in order 
to ensure adherence to the regulations could be monitored effectively, the EU negotiators 
insisted on making the new RoO applicable only by individual factory and only within 
SEZs,65 thereby reducing the number of firms that could readily take advantage of the rule 
changes. This also de facto means that improved accessibility to EU markets will be limited 
to companies that actually succeed in employing the required percentage of Syrian refugees. 
Jordanian negotiators succeeded, however, in adding a substantial number of zones to the 
five government-run development zones for which the scheme originally was foreseen in 
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the Jordan Compact.66 Factories and sectors located in Jordan’s Industrial Estates, such as 
the garment sector that exports successfully to the US market, now—at least in theory—also 
can gain access to the European market. Many firms in Jordan, however, have long been 
unable to export to the EU because of the relatively stringent standards required of all goods 
entering the European single market, which this deal does nothing to tackle.67 The deal that 
was negotiated in effect has meant that only a very limited pool of companies potentially 
could benefit from it.
Perspectives not only have differed on the opportunities offered by the specific regulations, 
but also regarding the very nature of the anticipated investments. Rather than discussing the 
economic utility and feasibility of the scheme, public discussions often have framed future 
potential investments as a European duty, or, alternatively, as a gift that Jordan deserves. 
To give just one example, an op-ed in the daily al-Ghad, echoing governmental statements, 
points out that given European governments’ fear of (more) Syrians taking refuge in their 
countries, it is their duty to create investments in Jordan, which can provide hundreds of 
thousands of jobs for Syrians and Jordanians.68 In such statements, investments appear not 
so much as driven by economic opportunity, but rather as a form of aid, which is assumed 
to be coming, if only you ask for it strongly enough. While this latter dynamic is a very 
well-established one in Jordan, particularly in times of crisis,69 actually attracting investments 
may not be so straightforward.
For those who are supposed actually to establish businesses in the designated areas, profit 
motives and calculations remain a central consideration. The possibilities of preferential 
access to EU markets, the inclusion of refugees in corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
strategies,70 as well as the waiving of fees for work permits plausibly could interest potential 
investors. Yet, factors like production and shipping costs, the quality of infrastructure and the 
transparency of regulations play a decisive role in these decisions as well, and Jordan fares 
relatively poorly on most of these fronts. Production costs remain comparatively high due 
to high costs of industrial inputs, especially fuel and electricity. Coupled with comparably 
low productivity levels among the local workforce, the costs hamper competitiveness with 
products from India, China or Turkey.71 In spite of a new investment law that is supposed to 
facilitate investment, Jordan’s rank in investment-related indices has deteriorated in recent 
66
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years.72 While Jordan’s political stability may have been a factor in establishing factories 
in the QIZs in the 1990s and early 2000s,73 the Arab uprisings, the Syria conflict and the 
rise of Islamic State, as well as the closure of borders and trade routes since 2011, have 
changed prevailing perceptions of Jordan and the region more broadly, and may well deter 
many potential investors.
Given these obstacles, uptake has been slow. By May 2017, fewer than 10 companies 
had registered to export under the new RoO regulation, and only one actually had done 
so,74 a turnout that has resulted in a blame game among donors, the government and the 
private sector,75 but also in renewed efforts to find or mobilize potential candidates.76 Yet it 
is uncertain from which countries and sectors new investments conceivably could come in 
the future. While Syrian investors are among those expected to take advantage of the new 
regulations,77 many already have found other bases in the last five years and probably will be 
reluctant to relocate again.78 Large Western companies, despite being involved in initial dis-
cussions surrounding the Compact, have not made the hoped-for investments, and Jordanian 
companies themselves are unlikely to fill in the gap. While they have suffered greatly from 
conflict and border closures in the region and are therefore looking for new markets, they 
often lack connections with potential buyers in the EU, and the knowledge about EU markets 
and product standards required for certification.79 Accordingly, there is currently hardly any 
local industry that actually would be ready or able to export to the EU market.
These unresolved difficulties are compounded by the fact that companies in the SEZs find 
it very difficult to recruit a sufficient number of (qualified) Syrians to fill the required quota,80 
for reasons that are discussed below. Similar difficulties have plagued the attempts to use 
72
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the scheme to employ Jordanians. This is an important aim for the GoJ, which needs to (be 
seen to) promote the interests of Jordanian workers, as governmental and media discourses 
systematically have portrayed Syrians as ‘taking their jobs’ and creating unmanageable 
burdens for Jordanian society.81 To this constituency, the policy change has been sold not 
just as a way of taking pressure off the broader Jordanian labor market by ‘zoning’ Syrian 
labor, but to revamp the economy and solve Jordanians’ economic woes. Jordan’s politicians, 
international organizations and donors alike have envisaged that the scheme could boost 
the manufacturing sector and thereby contribute to reducing unemployment, particularly 
among the youth.82 Initially, a 50/50 quota for the employment of Jordanians and Syrians 
in the SEZs was discussed in order to lend credence to these claims.83 Yet, it is questionable 
whether the rate of Jordanians working in manufacturing84 easily could be increased. The 
largely blue-collar jobs that the manufacturing sector can offer do not meet the expectations 
of many increasingly well-educated Jordanians, who usually aspire to white-collar jobs.85 In 
light of this, within a few months the proposed quota had been dropped, with donors now 
discussing, in general terms, the benefits of investment and the resulting multiplier effect 
for the Jordanian economy.86 From the GoJ’s perspective, increased Jordanian employment 
(along with donor funding) is one of the key goals of this scheme, but it remains unclear how 
this is to be achieved. In sum, the scheme has managed to mobilize the imaginaries, interests 
and hopes of a number of crucial actors and institutions, making it one of the most discussed 
current policy strategies regarding refugees in the entire region, and other parts of the world. 
Yet, it has not been able to overcome the contradictions of the zonal development model, nor 
the long-standing dynamics that have impeded the development of a manufacturing industry.
Garment Factories as Laboratories for Syrian Employment
Proponents of the Jordan Compact are detached not only from the situation on the ground, 
including the realities of the Jordanian trade regime but they also are detached from the role 
of Syrian refugees as a (potential) labor force and the question of how their lives in Jordan 
fit with the production regime in the manufacturing sector. Attempts to recruit them to work 
in the sector, and replace other migrant workers with them, have proven very difficult. This 
became particularly apparent in a high-profile pilot scheme in the garment sector. Announced 
in April 2016, shortly following the Jordan Compact, the scheme envisaged that 2,000 
Syrian refugees quickly would be recruited to work in the garment sector factories within 
81
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Jordan’s Industrial Estates.87 With the garment sector being one of Jordan’s most successful 
export-oriented sectors to date,88 it attracted attention from a range of actors seeking to think 
creatively about solutions to the labor market integration of Syrians. The pilot, which brought 
together JGATE (The Jordan Garments, Accessories and Textiles Exports Association), 
UNHCR, the World Bank, the Jordan Investment Commission (JIC), the Jordan Industrial 
Estates Company (JIEC), the Ministry of Labor (MoL) and others, was hailed as a promising 
partnership with the private sector, one which could lead the way in making Syrians more 
economically self-sufficient and simultaneously benefit the Jordanian economy. However, 
so far it has failed to accomplish these goals.
To implement the scheme, UNHCR and Better Work Jordan, an organization formed 
by a partnership between the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), organized job fairs in community centers close to the industrial 
zones in question, in an attempt to inform Syrians about the new opportunities in the garment 
sector, and to sign up those who were interested. These job fairs are widely perceived to 
have been unsuccessful—a fact that initially greatly surprised many of the architects of the 
scheme.89 Syrians were reluctant to sign up to work in the factories, which offer very poor 
levels of pay and working conditions, and are often located far from where they are living. 
While this work still at least can be financially interesting for the female South Asian workers 
who make up the bulk of the workforce, and who usually come to Jordan without families, 
live on site and do not have many other expenses, the situation is different for Syrians living 
in Jordan with their families. They have many in-country expenses, and rent alone easily can 
exceed this meagre salary, which is much less than in sectors such as construction.90 Despite 
assurances from UNHCR that receiving a work permit would not affect their status, Syrian 
refugees expressed concerns that taking formal jobs may do exactly that, or reduce their 
opportunities to access financial assistance or resettlement91—very valid concerns, given 
that donors are seeking to reduce funding levels as well as migratory movements by finding 
ways to make Syrians more ‘self-sufficient’ in the medium term. Syrian women were the 
(implicit) main target population of this scheme. If the target of 200,000 Syrians working 
is to be reached, it would require a large-scale recruitment drive among Syrian women. 
However, numerous sources reported that they were concerned about the lengthy journeys 
required, the lack of childcare facilities in the factories, and the prospect of mingling with 
unknown men in a large working environment, and therefore they did not pursue these work 
opportunities.92
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An equally, if not more, significant barrier to the successful implementation of this scheme 
has been the reluctance of factories operating in the zones to employ Syrians. At the heart of 
their reluctance, and of the wider dispute among different stakeholders, is the categorization 
of Syrians in the workforce. Currently, garment factories are allowed to employ migrant 
workers up to 75 percent of their workforce, while the remaining 25 percent should be 
Jordanians. This high proportion of migrant labor is of crucial importance to the functioning 
of the sector. Throughout the negotiation process, JGATE therefore has been demanding 
that the employment of Syrians should be outside the current migrant labor quota, and 
should be seen as a ‘humanitarian measure.’93 In other words, employers wanted to be able 
to replace their Jordanian labor with Syrians. Many factories already perceive themselves 
to be overly burdened by their obligations to employ a minimum of 25 per cent Jordanian 
citizens. Jordanians work shorter days than migrant workers (typically 8 hours rather than 
10 or 11 per day). They are seen as a drain on the factories’ productivity because they are 
only willing to do the easiest jobs and are more expensive to employ.94 They therefore 
endanger the dormitory-based labor control regime described above, which has been key to 
the success of the garment sector.
In the imaginative framework used by many employers, Syrians, like Jordanians, do not fit 
into this regime. They are perceived as less productive, skilled and trained than the (potential) 
pool of South Asian labor normally recruited to work in the sector.95 As the representative 
of JGATE explained, those Syrians who attended the job fairs ‘did not meet the factories’ 
expectations.’96 The demand to replace South Asian migrant workers with Syrian refugees 
thus appeared impossible. As JGATE stressed in a communiqué, ‘migrant employees are the 
CORE of this sector due to their higher efficiency and productivity, skill levels, willingness 
to work overtime, lower turnover rate. The migrant employees … cannot be REPLACED 
by Jordanians nor Syrians.’97 These disputes betray, as discussed above, that the Jordanian 
labor market is highly segmented by nationality, both between and within sectors. The 
substitution of Syrians for South Asian migrant workers would require a concurrent belief 
among employers that the two nationalities are straightforwardly substitutable, a belief that 
is clearly not currently prevalent in the garment sector. Whether appropriate or not, these 
entrenched beliefs make it more difficult to change the regulatory framework in which they 
exist and operate. As authors like Bauder98 show, they not only legitimate, but also shape and 
entrench the segmentation of labor markets, creating a boundary between relatively well-pro-
tected non-migrant workers and different groups of much more precarious and exploitable 
migrant workers, who are assigned a place in the labor market through ascribed corporeal, 
cultural or skills-related differences.99 Although historically and contextually contingent, 
these attributions tend to solidify and thereby complicate attempts to enact changes quickly.
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In the garment sector, these obstacles of perception combine with practical and political 
considerations to shape the labor force composition. In response to the GoJ’s requirement 
that 25 percent of factory employees be Jordanian, garment factories have opened 16 ‘satellite 
units’ across the country, mostly in poor, rural areas, and with a workforce that is almost 
exclusively Jordanian. While these satellite units often do not even break even, and are 
subsidized by the GoJ, they have made it easier for Jordanians, especially women, to work 
closer to home, in a more familiar environment. Thereby, they have effectively increased 
Jordanian employment in the sector.100
In principle, the same scheme also could be used to facilitate Syrian employment, and 
suggestions to this effect have been made, yet there have been no concrete moves to imple-
ment them.101 Employing Syrians in satellite factories is a politically tricky suggestion for 
the GoJ. Despite creative attempts to reinterpret the quota, for example by declaring Syrians 
to be an ‘additional’ component of the labor force, rather than simply ‘migrant workers,’ 
government representatives stress that Syrian employment must not eat into the quota for 
Jordanians.102 Jordanian unemployment is persistently and stubbornly high, and has risen 
since the start of the Syria crisis, from 11.4 percent in early 2012 to almost 16 percent by 
late 2016.103 Not only that, but the government assured its citizenry that it was going to the 
London conference to put Jordan first, and that providing jobs for Syrians would not be at 
the expense of jobs for Jordanians.104
In contrast to the priorities of the GoJ, employers have very little, if indeed any, desire 
to integrate Syrians into their workforce—as Dina Khayyat, then Chairperson of JGATE, 
stated clearly: ‘We are happy with what we have.’105 According to an official in the Ministry 
of Planning’s Project Management Unit (PMU), these sentiments extend well beyond the 
garment sector, with many employers very reluctant to swap their current migrant work-
ers for Syrians.106 In the garment sector, this has meant that by the end of 2016, only 30 
Syrians had been employed through the scheme.107 Yet at least on paper, the employers are 
still willing to continue the scheme.108 As Ms Khayyat explained, it is important for them 
to maintain their ‘social solidarity with Jordan.’109 This solidarity is arguably not just an 
altruistic sentiment: not only has the garment sector received positive publicity because of 
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its commitment to employ Syrians,110 but recent developments have opened up a large range 
of potentially useful and profitable connections with donors, European governments and 
markets, and UNHCR, which possesses a database of information about, and can provide 
access to, a highly exploitable labor force (in spite of the fact that their skill level is currently 
judged as low). Yet so far, two contradictory visions of who should and could conceivably 
be substituted by Syrians—South Asian labor migrants or Jordanian workers, combined 
with the (perceived) absence of decent working conditions in the sector, have prevented the 
scheme from being anything more than a blueprint.
Restructuring the (Informal) Labor Market
Given the difficulties of employing Syrians in a zonal development model, the broader 
labor market outside of the SEZs represents perhaps the only opportunity to get even close 
to 200,000 work permits. The two main ways through which this could be achieved are the 
formalization of Syrian workers currently working informally and the substitution of other 
migrant workers in favor of Syrians. A variety of initiatives pursuing one or both of these 
two strategies have been established. Yet as explored above, Jordan’s informalized labor 
market relies, to a significant degree, on illegal migrant labor and the non-enforcement or 
selective enforcement of labor regulations. We argue that the attempts to increase Syrians’ 
formal labor market participation do not sufficiently take these dynamics into account. 
Formalization or substitution strategies run into vested interests and political sensitivities 
that contribute to maintaining this informal system that relies on both Syrian and Egyptian 
migrant labor. While they may increase the security of those Syrians who get permits through 
these schemes, they may well leave large parts of both the Syrian and Egyptian populations 
in Jordan as precarious and vulnerable as they have been before.
The informalization and illegalization of the labor force, as well as the non-enforcement 
of labor regulations, are crucial when seeking to understand the status of Syrians in Jordan 
and current efforts to change it. Although Syrians’ labor market participation was largely 
illegalized until early 2016, many have worked informally since coming to Jordan. According 
to the ILO and Fafo, Syrians living outside of refugee camps in Jordan primarily work in 
construction, wholesale, retail and repair trades, agriculture and manufacturing. These four 
areas together were believed to employ around 80 percent of Syrians working in Jordan 
prior to the Jordan Compact,111 and are also areas in which, for all nationalities, there are 
high degrees of informality.112
With the Jordan Compact in place, many actors involved in its implementation hoped that 
these informal jobs now simply could be converted into formal ones. Besides filling a large 
part of the stated work permit target, formalization also was expected to bring improved 
social protection, wages and working conditions for Syrians, and to increase taxation and 
110
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other forms of revenue for the GoJ.113 Actors like UNHCR initially appeared keen to demon-
strate how the formalization of labor could happen ‘organically.’114 In practice, however, 
many vested interests have worked the other way. While every fee waiver announcement, 
or potential end of the grace period (before its renewal was announced), led to a spike 
in permits issued, overall numbers are still considerably smaller than hoped for, and the 
number of new issues has slowed down significantly since fall 2016, making an ‘organic’ 
evolution unlikely.115
It is difficult to see, for example, what incentives there are for employers to seek work 
permits for their employees on a large enough scale to come close to the ambitious targets 
that have been set. As is the case within the development zones, employers lack a clear 
financial incentive to employ Syrians formally. Even where employers take advantage of the 
temporary absence of work permit fees, workforce formalization still typically will increase 
their costs, because in many sectors they now will be formally liable to pay social security 
contributions for their registered employees.116 Furthermore, while work permits were issued 
to Syrians without fees for most of 2016 and for 2017, they are renewable annually, so future 
renewals may well incur fees.
Given the number of Jordanians, Egyptians, Syrians and other nationalities who work 
informally in the Jordanian economy,117 it is implausible to envisage that companies’ work-
forces will in the future consist of Syrians with work permits alongside informally employed 
Jordanians, and Egyptians without permits or without the correct permits for their sector. 
Informal labor is too pervasive a feature of Jordan’s economy to change by decree. Many 
of the small businesses Syrians work in do not even have a valid license. As a report by the 
Jordanian NGO ARDD points out: ‘To achieve [a regularization of Syrians’ status] it will be 
necessary for entities to become legal, which may present as an insurmountable challenge 
for small businesses. Unofficial entities may not see it within their interest to regularize 
Syrian labor.’118 It is thus likely that most of the work permits given in retail, wholesale and 
trade to date—the sector that makes up most small businesses in Jordan—come from entities 
that have a formalized status already, and that the further issuing of work permits will be 
limited by the informality of both businesses themselves and their non-Syrian workforce.
It is also unlikely that threats of punishment will eliminate Syrian informal labor. Fines 
are the main potential penalty for employers who hire staff without work permits, if they 
are caught by the Ministry of Labor’s inspectors. Yet it is not clear that these fines are an 
adequate and effective incentive not to employ Syrians without permits. Throughout Jordan 
stories abound of employers who, with the right connections in the Ministry, or in exchange 
113
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for the right price, can find out when labor inspectors are coming with enough notice to 
send their Syrian employees away beforehand.119 Therefore this symbolic threat does not 
actually incentivize formalization on a large scale. What it does though is make Syrians feel 
more insecure, thereby potentially increasing their exploitability. As discussed earlier, the 
selective enforcement of labor regulations is a central contributing factor to an informalized 
workforce. Events like symbolic round-ups of migrant workers simultaneously make an ille-
galized foreign labor force and its ‘normal’ economic integration in the country visible and 
render that population more precarious. By emphasizing the boundary between the national 
and the non-national, they remind migrant workers of their precarious status in a country.120
Some of these structural difficulties gradually have become clear to those invested in the 
scheme. Accordingly, many efforts have been made to redesign the employment conditions 
in specific sectors such that they could facilitate a formalization process, with mixed results. 
Agriculture has witnessed the biggest strides to date. One key difficulty in this sector is 
that the work undertaken by Syrian labor is typically casual, varying from day to day, and 
season to season, to meet the needs of employers. This disincentives individual employers 
from applying for a work permit, which under Jordanian law is predicated on a year-long 
job contract. This was tackled by a June 2016 regulation that allowed Syrians to apply for 
work permits through agricultural cooperatives, enabling them to work for more than one 
employer. Largely through this mechanism, agriculture has been the sector that has distrib-
uted the largest number of work permits, totaling over 16,000 by May 2017.121 This has 
been further helped by the fact that the agricultural sector is exempt from the requirement 
for social security registration. Therefore, it has come to be seen as a comparably easy path 
to a work permit, and many Syrians with agricultural permits actually work in other sectors, 
without encountering many problems during inspections.122 It remains to be seen, however, 
whether this system will continue to work if/when work permit fees are re-introduced.
Attempts to replicate this model in the construction sector, however, have proved 
challenging, because of workers’ desires not to be bound to one employer, and because of 
the absence of an organization to play a role parallel to that of the agricultural cooperatives. 
While many Syrians therefore continued to work in the sector informally, some reportedly 
resorted to brokers acting as stand-in employers, a tactic common among Egyptian migrant 
workers in Jordan. Such brokers often demand fees for their services, ranging from 100 
to 400 Jordanian dinars (about $140 to $560), which prevent Syrians without means from 
accessing this informal system.123 In the spring of 2017, the MoL signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with the Construction Contractors Association that enabled the 
association to issue work permits and for Syrians with such permits to move between 
employers. The MoU also waived the quotas for hiring Jordanian labor in the construction 
sector. Although there was an initial spike in work permits in construction after the signing 
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of the MoU, it is too early to tell the full extent to which these arrangements will increase 
the number of work permits for Syrians in the sector.124
The manufacturing sector also has witnessed a significant degree of formalization, with 
just under 10,000 work permits issued by May 2017.125 This is arguably because, unlike 
agriculture or construction, manufacturing jobs are more likely to resemble permanent, full-
time jobs, even when being done informally.126 The work permits granted to Syrians in this 
sector often formalized these pre-existing working arrangements.127 However, while roughly 
4,500 Syrians were granted work permits in manufacturing from March–July 2016,128 it took 
almost a year for this number to be replicated.129 This suggests that the manufacturing route 
for increasing work permit numbers may be approaching a limit, and it indicates a broader 
trend across the sectors: the issuing of new permits is stagnating, and there is a perception 
among many consulted stakeholders that a ceiling is about to be reached.130 The relatively 
low-hanging fruit have been picked, but deeper constraints relating to widespread informality 
and the lack of enforcement of labor law remain relatively untouched.
While some of the movement in these sectors is due to these measures, the decisive rea-
son why many Syrians have received work permits is they paid their employers, or brokers, 
to apply for one on their behalf, or they covered associated fees, as well as social security 
contributions, themselves.131 In order to make Jordan’s policies work in their favor, Syrians 
are thus shouldering the financial burdens of the new approach. This represents an important 
continuity with previous policies that left Syrians effectively responsible for paying whatever 
is needed in order to resolve legal status issues and get access to services in Jordan.132 While 
those with better resources have been able to buy themselves some temporary security, many 
others have been left behind. That some formalization has occurred does nothing to lessen 
the conditions of vulnerability that have been created for this latter group.
The same can be argued for attempts to substitute another informalized migrant labor 
force—Egyptians—with Syrians. These efforts may well make Egyptians more vulnerable 
to exploitation and criminalization. The GoJ estimates that an estimated 520,000 Egyptians 
live in Jordan, and approximately 320,000 of them do not currently hold work permits. Many 
who hold work permits now work in a different sector than the one for which the permit 
originally was issued.133 No new permits currently are being issued for Egyptians; while 
existing permits are eligible for renewal, this comes with a new flat cost of 500 Jordanian 
dinars, which represents a significant fee increase for sectors such as agriculture. There are 
also reports of an increasing number of deportations of Egyptians found working without a 
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permit, a trend that has created shortages that are felt acutely in sectors like agriculture or 
construction.134 This indicates a degree of rebalancing, a continuation of previous policies 
of selective formalization and informalization of Egyptian labor, toward a (temporarily) 
more restrictive approach, which may well push many Egyptians working in Jordan into 
an informalized situation.
Yet these new measures do not signify a wholesale policy change. Jordan’s policies toward 
Egyptians working in the Kingdom have political, diplomatic, and economic repercussions 
for both states. Egyptian workers in Jordan represent an important source of remittances for 
the Egyptian economy, and therefore have been a source of political leverage for Jordan.135 
Jordan, however, heavily depends on the availability of cheap gas from Egypt, as Jordan’s 
electricity bill makes up a substantial amount of its growing debt. Any moves to decrease 
substantially the number of Egyptians (formally) working in Jordan in favor of Syrians 
could damage its multifaceted bilateral relations with Egypt.136 The reduction of the size of 
the Egyptian workforce, ostensibly, has been a goal of the GoJ for many years, but little has 
been done practically to achieve this aim.137 Past attempts to deport Egyptians were stopped 
because they caused diplomatic upheavals,138 and in 2016/17 countervailing measures, such 
as a grace period for Egyptians to formalize their status, have co-existed with, and to some 
extent balanced, policies that implied an attempt to reduce the size of the (formal) Egyptian 
labor force.139 Therefore the GoJ’s continuation of the selective formalization and informal-
ization of Egyptian labor enables it to balance competing interests, while also allowing it 
domestically to maintain a public commitment to creating jobs for Jordanians through the 
substitution of migrant workers.
Besides diplomatic issues, substitution attempts are also inhibited by the prevailing 
dynamics and imaginaries of the informal labor market. As previously discussed in the 
case of the garment industry, there are widespread beliefs about the suitability of different 
nationalities for different labor market activities. While, in abstract economic labor market 
supply terms, Egyptian construction workers could be substituted with Syrian construction 
workers, it is ‘known’ in Jordan that while Egyptians can be relied upon to do long shifts 
of hard manual labor, Syrians are more suited to decoration and interior design.140 While 
some substitution has occurred, Syrians’ work in the sector—often mediated by Egyptian 
brokers and foremen—is typically limited to subordinate positions, which may well keep 
these ideas alive.141
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Given these political and practical intricacies it is very unlikely that the status of either 
Syrians or Egyptians will be redefined unambiguously or that formalization will happen 
across the board. Rather, we are witnessing a partial formalization of Syrian labor and a 
concomitant partial informalization of Egyptian labor. However, once the current donor focus 
on formalizing Syrian labor lapses, both Syrians and Egyptians may well remain semi-for-
malized, along with many other nationalities of migrants in the country. In this situation, 
employers are likely to continue to be able to find Egyptians as well as Syrians to employ 
with or without work permits. Although the possibility of formalization may benefit some 
Syrians, this situation may well leave other Syrians, as well as Egyptians, just as precarious 
and exploitable as before, in some cases even more so.
Despite the limitations of the formalization efforts, those Syrians who potentially may 
be eligible to receive work permits are very aware, and very supportive, of the changes.142 
Syrians who continue to work informally typically do so under the threat and fear of forced 
encampment or refoulement if they are caught working without a permit, especially if they 
are caught more than once.143 Syrians are therefore eager to obtain work permits, but their 
ability to do so is limited by the sector they (wish to) work in, the widespread degree of 
informality in the Jordanian labor market, as well as the regulatory and sector-specific 
constraints detailed in this article. While helping Jordan reach its short-term work permit 
goals, current efforts to reform employment conditions do very little, if anything, to tackle 
the underlying structuring dynamics of the labor market. As a senior official working on the 
refugee response in Jordan self-critically noted:
I think we are not really discussing the structural deficiencies endemic to the Jordanian 
economy, we are just looking at working inadequately within it. The GoJ and everyone 
is kind of coming to terms with just how informal the economy is .... [s]o you just keep 
putting these band-aids on a cut that is super big. But I guess it’s good for making 
sure that Syrians don’t get [sent to the camps].144
Conclusion
This article has analyzed the initiatives and measures taken since early 2016 that seek to 
facilitate Syrian refugees’ access to the formal labor market and traced the twists and turns 
of these supposedly sweeping policy shifts to date. We have argued that the plan formally to 
‘make refugees work’ successfully has mobilized a large number of important stakeholders 
in such a way as to turn it into a policy success, regardless of its actual effects on those 
supposed to be helped by it. The underlying claim that two birds—humanitarian obligations 
toward Syrian refugees and Jordan’s economic development needs—can be killed with one 
stone has brought together humanitarian and economic actors, both national and interna-
tional, governmental and non-governmental. This alliance, and the creation of a globalized 
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blueprint, we have argued, was made possible by these actors’ relative detachment from 
the realities of, respectively, the Jordanian labor market and the lives and perspectives of 
Syrian refugees. Looking at the three most prominent strategies attempted to make the 
Jordan Compact happen—the expansion, substitution and formalization of employment—has 
revealed various frictions that point to conflicting projects of government and development 
among the actors and organizations involved. These strategies stand in tension with a polit-
ical economy and labor market that have evolved in the country over decades, and that have 
complicated the scheme’s realization.
Firstly, the plan to employ refugees in special economic zones and to boost Jordan’s 
economy by attracting investments through trade concessions has proven hard to roll out 
when confronted by these complexities. Many of the grand visions for increasing foreign 
investments stand in tension with the rationalities of potential (even ethical) investors, the 
unwillingness/inability of existing employers to find the requisite numbers of Syrians to 
employ, and the many remaining impediments for successfully exporting to the EU. The 
vision of refugee employment in SEZs is also at odds with a perspective that emphasizes 
not just work for Syrian refugees, but decent work. In those zones that actually do make 
profits, success often has been bought at the expense of harsh working conditions and low 
wages, which have deterred Syrian refugees from taking up employment there.
Secondly, the scheme’s unfolding has revealed competing visions of Syrians’ place in, 
and the effects of, Jordan’s entrenched and highly segmented labor market. We have shown 
throughout this article that Syrians are located in a gray zone between local and migrant work-
ers in a labor market that draws sharp divisions and distinctions between those two groups, 
as well as between different nationalities of migrant workers, genders, and along other axes. 
Attempts to replace migrant workers with Syrians have run up against these pre-existing labor 
regimes, and Syrians have become the object of unresolved debates about where the boundary 
between different parts of the labor force lies. Another effect of this segmentation is that, more 
often than not, the twin goals of bringing Syrians into formal jobs and creating employment 
for Jordanians (and, beyond that, fostering Jordan’s economic and infrastructural development) 
are actually conflictual rather than complementary. While Syrian formal labor plausibly can 
benefit Jordan’s economy in a number of ways, it has become relatively clear that Jordanian 
(un)employment is not one of them. Whereas some Jordanians benefit from employing migrant 
workers (and/or Syrians), this tends not to lead to improvements in Jordanian job prospects. 
The underlying mismatch between the jobs the Jordanian economy can offer, and the skills 
and expectations of Jordanians, cannot be solved through the proposed measures.
Thirdly, the donor-driven push to formalize (Syrian) refugee labor stands in tension with 
the long-established dynamics of an informalized labor market, and with the interests of 
the actors for whom this informalized or semi-formalized system works. Various efforts 
to facilitate this process have revealed that, while some jobs can be formalized through 
changed incentives and regulations, others defy such attempts, demonstrating how entrenched 
informal arrangements are in sectors like construction or retail, wholesale and trade. The 
non-enforcement of labor legislation has constituted a compromise in the past, and likely 
will continue to do so, only in a rebalanced version that formalizes some Syrian employment 
while keeping other Syrians, as well as many Egyptians and also Jordanians, in precarious 
informalized positions.
Frictions between the different projects of government and development do not just occur 
between ‘humanitarian’ and ‘economic’ actors. These groups, and their projects, are not so 
monolithic, and as our analysis shows their goals can and do overlap. This is not least due 
to shared or similar organizational logics. The number of work permits issued to Syrians 
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quickly became, in part due to strong pressure from some donor agencies, a core indicator 
of the scheme’s success, and has been adopted as such by the GoJ and other stakeholders. 
Yet the joint attempts to increase the number of permits as quickly as possible have favored 
quick fixes at the expense of more lasting solutions. This effectively has left behind many 
Syrians who do not fulfill the criteria, and also has left other refugees on the sidelines.
Our analysis of the Jordanian context has important implications for the future of the 
global governmental project to ‘make refugees work.’ While the labor market in Ethiopia 
(or to wherever the scheme next is exported) may or may not be similar to Jordan, it will be 
more complex than any blueprint could account for, and will contain its own stratifications, 
hierarchies, and exclusions. Due to their supposed universalism, such ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approaches, which have gained popularity in humanitarian circles in recent years, often 
overlook or exclude those potential ‘beneficiaries’ who do not easily fit into predetermined 
frameworks. They also ignore the specific histories and socioeconomic contexts of the places 
they seek to reshape and ‘improve,’ yet these factors shape what is possible, and they cannot 
be wished, decreed or imagined away.
Within Jordan, these factors have played a large role in ensuring that the scheme has not 
gone according to plan. This arguably should be expected, as it is the norm rather than the 
exception that supposedly universal ideas take on a reality of their own in a specific con-
text. The progress that has been made largely has been on the sidelines of the high-profile 
initiatives that were announced with much fanfare. The greatest numbers of work permits 
have been issued through processes of formalization, rather than in the factories of Jordan’s 
Special Economic Zones. It remains uncertain how close to 200,000 work permits the 
Compact will reach through these projects, and even if the target were reached, whether these 
jobs would be decent and sustainable. What is certain is that Syrian refugees are very weakly 
integrated into the networks of humanitarian actors, donors, and governmental agencies that 
represent the trustees of this ‘development opportunity.’ As the objects of development, they 
do not have, and are very unlikely to develop, a strong voice in the worlds of those who 
negotiate their socioeconomic fate. In the face of attempts to ‘make refugees work,’ Syrians 
have been left with two choices: either to refuse to entertain the paltry options offered to 
them, or to try to turn whatever possibilities that emerge from the scheme to their advantage.
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